Chapter 499: Diplomatic Fever
"The East Africa–Portugal War ended with a whimper rather than a bang, proving that Portugal is simply not in the same league as East Africa. It's like Mexico versus the United States. We are witnessing the rapid emergence of a regional hegemon in Africa, akin to the United States in North America. If no one curbs East Africa's growth, then Africa will become a continent for Africans." — The Times
In response to this "Africa for Africans" claim, The Sun conducted a special interview with East Africa's ambassador to Germany, Will.
"Ambassador Will, The Times recently suggested that Africa will become a continent for Africans. Was this statement meant to allude to East Africa?"
Will replied, "We reject that idea. East Africa has never claimed Africa is for Africans. In fact, East Africa's influence is limited to its own borders. North Africa belongs to the traditional Arab sphere, France holds sway in West Africa, Britain remains strong in the south, and other countries like Spain, Italy, and Belgium are all involved in the region. This shows that Africa today is a mosaic—not the singular domain of any one group. I must ask: who are 'Africans'? Who speaks for them? Not Germany, not France, not the Arabs. 'Africa for Africans' is just a vague and anxious slogan."
Will's interview attracted widespread attention in Europe. Until now, East Africa had maintained a relatively low profile on the continent. But the East Africa–Portugal War sparked European curiosity about this African nation for the first time.
Portugal, a long-standing colonial power, was thoroughly humiliated. Domestic media turned their ire on both East Africa and the current government, aligning with The Times to portray East Africa as the greatest threat in Africa.
After all, Portugal had never suffered such disgrace. Losing Brazil had hurt, and previous defeats to Spain, the Netherlands, and Britain were at least understandable. But to be beaten and forced into concessions by an African nation—that was a national humiliation.
Portugal's current government collapsed, and the new prime minister vowed to recover lost territory by any means necessary, even announcing sanctions against East Africa.
The more Portugal raged, the less East Africa cared. Sanctions? Laughable. East Africa saw Portugal as nothing more than a clown. Meanwhile, other countries began digging into the real reasons behind Portugal's failure.
The result was a surge of analysis on East Africa's national strength. Since East Africa maintained a policy of isolation, its navy was the most visible measure of its power.
And the world was shocked to discover that East Africa's navy now ranked seventh globally—just behind Austria-Hungary and ahead of Germany. Its army numbers were only estimates, but based on the war, observers believed East Africa had at least 200,000 troops.
From a military standpoint, East Africa was now a global power. Exactly how strong? Unclear. But certainly stronger than Portugal.
This led to a revival of the "East Africa threat" theory—something that had been circulating since East Africa took over South Africa. Most of those early discussions, however, had been suppressed by media outlets affiliated with the Hechingen Consortium.
As for the slogan "Africa for Africans," East Africa would never be foolish enough to embrace it. Everyone knew "Africans" generally referred to Black Africans. No way East Africa would be so eager to expel itself from the German sphere of identity.
Still, the bitterness in The Times and Portuguese media clearly reflected Britain and Portugal's true feelings. The East Africa–Portugal War had ended only because Britain forced Portugal to accept it. The British understood something crucial: East Africa had not even gone all out—and Portugal had already been bled dry.
One of the most immediate consequences of the war was that several nations began actively seeking friendly relations with East Africa—chief among them Italy and Belgium. Both countries had colonies neighboring East African territory, and for strategic reasons, they needed to cultivate good ties.
Thus, Italy and Belgium sent diplomats to Dar es Salaam to negotiate the establishment of formal relations—marking the first time European nations had taken the initiative to establish ties with East Africa. The Netherlands followed shortly afterward.
East Africa already had informal contact with all three, similar to how the German Chamber of Commerce operated in the Far Eastern Empire during East Africa's early colonial days. But the war took things to a new level.
The Netherlands already had good relations with East Africa and had collaborated on various projects. It likely also noticed East Africa's activities on Borneo and wanted a formal diplomatic framework to prevent future conflict.
The Lanfang Republic's territory was small, and handing it over to East Africa wasn't a big deal. But nearby were Dutch colonies. If conflict broke out, East Africa now clearly had the ability to cut off Dutch access to the East Indies.
To these friendly nations, East Africa welcomed all comers. But its designated diplomatic zones raised a few eyebrows.
East Africa placed its embassies in Dar es Salaam—not in the capital, First Town. Officially, this was out of goodwill: Dar es Salaam was the most developed city, while First Town lacked the necessary infrastructure for foreign missions.
It was true—First Town's commerce and services couldn't match Dar es Salaam's. But it wasn't quite the backwater East Africa claimed.
From Ernst's perspective, this made perfect sense. East Africa wasn't yet close enough to these nations to allow them to set up embassies in the capital. As a highly centralized regime, First Town's officials had access to sensitive information and could be vulnerable to espionage. Better to keep foreign diplomats in Dar es Salaam.
And it wasn't far—less than an hour by train, with telegraph access to boot.
In addition to these nations pursuing tangible interests, others with friendly ties to the Hechingen royal family or East Africa also established embassies.
Ernst placed those embassies in First Town: Germany, Austria-Hungary, newly independent Romania, Sweden, the Far Eastern Empire, and Paraguay.
The Far Eastern Empire's embassy was particularly unique. Its relationship with East Africa wasn't clearly defined, but it was certainly among the more agreeable of the world's powers—at least diplomatic negotiations were smooth.
East Africa also had a third category of embassies: those on Zanzibar Island. These included the Ottoman Empire, the United States, Japan, and others.
In truth, East Africa's foreign policy was deeply colored by Ernst's personal preferences—highlighting just how absolute the Hechingen royal family's control over the state had become.
The three embassy zones reflected East Africa's diplomatic stratification: First Town for close friends, Dar es Salaam for friendly nations, and Zanzibar Island for everyone else.
There was also a layer of secrecy involved. For example, East Africa's hybrid economic model was something Ernst didn't want to make public. With the shadow of the Paris Commune still lingering in Europe, East Africa didn't want any ideological comparisons. Even though their systems were completely different, too many of the policies overlapped, and opportunistic critics might seize on those similarities.
In today's world—whether monarchy, class rule, or slavery—none of those systems were particularly popular. East Africa, to put it bluntly, was far too reactionary.
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